Rationality As a Collection of Attributes

Theoretical and Methodological Implications of Schelling’s Theory of Rational
Behavior for Cognitive Economic Theory

Rationality as a Collection of Attributes by Angela Ambrosino and Paolo Pietro Biancone

In Rationality as a Collection of Attributes, Ambrosino and Biancone explore Thomas Schelling’s evolving view of rationality. Schelling challenges the traditional idea of humans as purely rational actors by emphasizing that rationality consists of multiple attributes, shaped by internal and social interactions. His work, which spans decades, provides a nuanced perspective on decision-making, addiction, and strategic behavior.

Some Interesting Findings:

1. Rationality as a Multi-Self Concept
   Schelling suggests that individuals are not unitary decision-makers but rather a “small collectivity” of selves. These multiple selves often compete, especially in cases like addiction, where one self desires consumption while another strives for self-control. This internal conflict complicates traditional rational choice models.
2. Strategic Interaction within Individuals
   Schelling extends his game theory analysis to the internal realm, arguing that individuals face strategic dilemmas not just in social contexts but within themselves. Decisions like self-commitment or addiction recovery can be seen as games between conflicting internal selves, each with different preferences and values.
3. The Role of Irrational Behavior in Decision-Making
   Rather than dismissing irrational behavior as noise, Schelling integrates it into his theory, showing how it plays a key role in both social and internal interactions. His work illustrates that departures from perfect rationality—such as emotions or habits—are critical to understanding human behavior.

This rethinking of rationality opens the door to a more realistic understanding of human decision-making, where cognitive limitations and emotional factors are integral to choices.

Want To KNOw More?